Upon granting a request to proceed *in forma pauperis*, a Court additionally screens the complaint pursuant to § 1915. Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is legally "frivolous or malicious," fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. *See Cato v. United States*, 70 F.3d

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1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. *Igbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Secondly, where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the line from plausible to conceivable, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Allegations of a prose complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleading drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Igbal).

## A. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute. *See Rasul v. Bush*, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Cases "arise under" federal law either when federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on the construction of federal law. *Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez*, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which provides that "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." *Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams*, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

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Plaintiff's complaint asserts employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. *See* Docket No. 1-1 at 1. Claims under that statute invoke the Court's federal jurisdiction.

Having determined that federal-question jurisdiction exists under the well-pleaded complaint

## **B.** Plaintiff's Claims

rule, the Court now turns to the sufficiency of the factual allegations to state a claim. Plaintiff brings claims for racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Title VII allows persons to sue an employer for discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, gender or national origin if he or she has exhausted both state and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administrative procedures. Once plaintiff files charges with the EEOC, the commission will investigate the charges, attempt to reach a settlement, and decide whether to sue the employer or refer the decision to sue to the Attorney General if the charges are against a state or local governmental entity. *Id.* If the EEOC or Attorney General decides not to sue and if there is no settlement that is satisfactory to plaintiff, the EEOC will issue plaintiff a right-to-sue letter and plaintiff will have exhausted his remedies with the EEOC. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). After receipt of the right to sue letter, plaintiff may sue in federal or state court. *Id.*; *see also Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donenelly*, 494 U.S. 820, 825-26, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990). Here, Plaintiff has attached a right to sue letter from the EEOC to his complaint. *See* Docket No. 1-1 at 6-7. Thus, it appears Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies.

To sufficiently allege a *prima facie* case of discrimination in violation of Title VII to survive a § 1915 screening, Plaintiff must allege: (a) she belonged to a protected class; (b) she was qualified for her job; (c) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (d) similarly situated employees not in her protected class received more favorable treatment. *See Shepard v. Marathon Staffing, Inc.*, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 76097, \*5 (D. Nev. June 2, 2014) (citing *Moran v. Selig*, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006)). In screening Plaintiff's complaint and construing it liberally, the Court looks in part to the attachments provided. *See Swartz v. KPMG LLP*, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (courts may generally consider allegations contained in pleadings, as well as exhibits

attached to the complaint). Plaintiff's complaint attaches his "charge of discrimination," which alleges that he is white, that he performed his job for roughly six years, that his employment was terminated, and that similarly situated non-white employees engaged in similar misconduct but were not discharged. *See* Docket No. 1-1 at 3-4. Plaintiff has, therefore, stated a racial discrimination claim against his employer.

To sufficiently allege a *prima facie* case of retaliation in violation of Title VII to survive a § 1915 screening, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that he or she committed a protected act, such as complaining about discriminatory practices; (2) that the employee suffered some sort of adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the employee's action and the adverse act. *See Jenkins v. Lab. Corp. Of Am.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 118008, \*5 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2013) (citing *Davis v. Team Elec Co.*, 520 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2008)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he complained of discriminatory treatment, that his employment was thereafter terminated, and that the termination was retaliation for engaging in protected activity. *See* Docket No. 1-1 at 3-4. Plaintiff has, therefore, stated a retaliation claim against his employer.

Hence, construing Plaintiff's pleadings liberally, he has stated a claim for racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.<sup>1</sup>

## III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing and good cause appearing, therefore,

## IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's request to proceed *in forma pauperis* is **GRANTED**. Plaintiff shall not be required to pay the filing fee. Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> When the Court screens a complaint, it does so without the benefit of an adversarial presentation. *Cf. Buchheit v. Green*, 705 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening "a complaint without benefit of an adversarial presentation is often an uncertain and time-consuming task"). Nothing in this order precludes Defendant from filing a motion to dismiss as to any claim brought by Plaintiff.

It is not clear whether Plaintiff intends to bring other claims, such as a hostile work environment claim. See Docket No. 1-1 at 1, 3. The Court does not express any opinion as to any such claims. It is enough at the screening stage that the Court has determined that at least racial discrimination and retaliation claims have been stated. See, e.g., Jenkins, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11808, at \*6 n.1.

conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of any additional fees or costs or the giving of a security therefor. This Order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis shall not extend to the issuance of subpoenas at government expense.

- 2. The Clerk of the Court shall file the Complaint and shall issue Summons to Defendant, and deliver the same to the U.S. Marshal for service. Plaintiff shall have twenty days in which to furnish the U.S. Marshal with the required Form USM-285. Within twenty days after receiving from the U.S. Marshal a copy of the Form USM-285, showing whether service has been accomplished, Plaintiff must file a notice with the court identifying whether defendant was served. If Plaintiff wishes to have service again attempted on an unserved defendant, a motion must be filed with the court identifying the unserved defendant and specifying a more detailed name and/or address for said defendant, or whether some other manner of service should be attempted. Pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service must be accomplished within 120 days from the date this order is entered.
- 3. From this point forward, Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon the attorney(s), a copy of every pleading motion or other document submitted for consideration by the court. Plaintiff shall include with the original papers submitted for filing a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed to Defendant or counsel for Defendant. The Court may disregard any paper received by a District Judge or Magistrate Judge which has not been filed with the Clerk, and any paper received by a District Judge, Magistrate Judge, or the Clerk which fails to include a certificate of service.

Dated: January 21, 2015

United States Magistrate Judge

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